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Positive Pragmatic Pluralism 
Juliet Floyd, Boston University 





 Realism and the question of how best to represent reality, including our 
representations of ourselves representing that reality: these were Hilary Putnam’s great 
and perennial philosophical concerns. No one who fails to appreciate their difficulty and 
centrality to all of philosophy can fully appreciate his life.   
 "I am," he once said to me in conversation, "an American philosopher: I take 
science seriously”. This meant taking all the sciences seriously, and knowing as much of 
their individuality as he could.  It meant knowing about each science’s fundamental 
limits.  It meant never being “scientistic”, that is, a worshipper of science as such.  It 
meant rejecting any methodological dichotomy between fact and value.  And it entailed 
democratic commitment to inclusiveness in education and in philosophy, academic and 
otherwise: of peoples, traditions, genders, and perspectives.   
 In these intellectual commitments and the study and furtherance of the American 
tradition as a tradition Hilary was importantly joined by Ruth Anna Putnam.1  They were 
my teachers from the age of nineteen until now.  No one ever had better academic 
parents. I owe them --- we all owe them --- a great “Thank You”.   There is no possibility 
that Hilary could have accomplished what he did, philosophically, without Ruth Anna.  It 
was an extraordinary intellectual adventure and collaboration.  
 Why did Hilary take so seriously the problem of “representation and reality”?  Why 
did he construe this as the puzzling question of “How does language hook onto the 
world?”  Because questions about reference are questions about truth, and for Hilary truth 
remains central and contested, however primordial it is.  Tarski clarified certain formal 
aspects of the notion, especially that of definable in a language.  He did not, however, 
reduce away the issue of truth.2  The etymology of the word “true” is loyalty, 
trustworthiness, what will not let us down.  Hilary stuck with questions about truth 
                                                
1 See Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam 1993, "Education for Democracy." 
2 What Hilary regarded as the clearest formulation of this point in his work appeared just last year, in his 2015/2016, 
“Naturalism, Realism and Normativity”.  The whole volume with this title, Putnam 2016---his final book---is relevant. 
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through his whole life, refusing to replace the notion with a simple, instrumentalized, 
formulaic, deflationary or trivial one.  As he saw it, struggles over truth remain central in 
a modern industrialized democracy. We are and should be conceptual pluralists, but we 
should not be—anyway not all of us—sceptics.   Sustained attention to our notions of 
representation and reality is essential, not only for getting our ideals of knowledge and 
belief right, but also those of justice, morality, and politics.  
 Recently Hilary argued that ethical, political and cultural notions—and he would 
have said fundamental logical ones too—are “Lamarckian”: like Lamarck’s account of 
the giraffe’s neck, they grow longer and stronger only with exercise, repeated over 
generations.3  They are inherited culture.  Darwin tells us a great deal, but not all that 
much about most the fundamental, general notions we deal with in philosophy.  
Wholesale reduction of our social and intellectual capacities to natural selection’s picture 
of explanatory adequacy is dangerous.  Moral progress requires us to respect, not only 
our animal and social natures, biologically speaking, but also our cultural, historical, 
conceptual and philosophical plasticities and limits.  Ultimately there are norms 
everywhere.  Genuine intelligence—both the concept of it and its realization—is hard-
won.  It is not replaceable by artificial intelligence.  Nor should the distinction between 
genuine and artificial intelligence be an issue left to the psychologists and engineers to 
determine.  It can’t be put only into their court, given what Hilary called the “ubiquity of 
the  normative”.4  Every algorithm swims within a goal, a purpose, some standards of 
correctness and incorrectness, and as such it is subject to discussion. 
 This Hilary always believed, even during his foray into functionalism, a proposed 
computational analysis of the idea of trial-and-error, intentional psychological states.  He 
knew too much logic not to know the provable limitations of any such model of 
rationality, given Gödel.  Later, he stressed that the idea of a Turing Machine, when 
regarded as an idealized description of our psychologies, is “bad science fiction”.5  This 
is not the best reading of the real Turing, as I argued in some of my last philosophical 
                                                
3 Hilary Putnam, 2014/2016, “What Evolutionary Theory Doesn’t Tell Us about Ethics”. 
4 I discuss the importance of this notion in Floyd 2005, "Putnam’s ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’: Externalism in 
Historical Context." 
5 Cf. Hilary Putnam, 2009, “On Computational Psychology”.   
 
Submitted Draft of 3/19/17. 
To appear in The Harvard Review of Philosophy 
 3 
conversations with Hilary.6  Yet all along, even when he was becoming famous as an 
articulator of this (mis)reading of Turing, Hilary (like Turing himself) knew too much 
real science not to argue, repeatedly, that normative and unformalizeable values like 
“coherence”, “simplicity”, “common sense” and “rightness” in general are everywhere 
embedded in method.  Most fundamentally, the notion of truth, of representation and 
reality, eludes the functionalist model.7     
  In this “Lamarckianism” about cultural and philosophical notions Hilary followed 
Peirce, James, Dewey and, in certain qualified respects, Quine and Wittgenstein.  He was 
a self-described “liberal naturalist.8  Yet he was much more than an anti-reductionist or 
humanist taking the “manifest” image of our world for granted.  He was also much more 
than a scientific philosopher of uncommonly impressive range and depth of knowledge.  
Hilary was a positive pragmatic pluralist, making positive existential claims about what 
particular things, properties, possibilities and concepts there are.  And he was always at 
work defending his right to say “there are” in a reasonable, defensible, non-schematic or 
ironic way.  
 He drew a great deal from Quine’s and Carnap’s open-ended, revisable empiricism, 
agreeing with much in Carnap’s radical reconstrual of ontological questions as relative, 
logico-linguistic and pragmatic in character.  But like Quine, his philosophy aimed to be 
comprehensive and, at least in some firm, even if idealized, sense, true.  He firmly 
rejected as starting points traditional dichotomies between analytic and synthetic, formal 
and informal, conceptual and non-conceptual, even if relativized to particular languages.  
Also like Quine, he avoided any serious reliance on general epistemological notions such 
as “intuition”, “certainty” “experience” or “experiment” and saw systems of belief as the 
focus.   He refused to concede that such unavoidable notions as “simplicity”, “trial and 
error” and “observation” may be fully algorithmicized or made part of something called 
“the scientific method”—much less absorbed into metaphysics as absolute notions.9  
                                                
6 See Floyd 2016, "Chains of Life: Turing, Lebensform, and the Emergence of Wittgenstein’s Later Style" and Floyd 
in-press 2017b, "Turing on ‘Common Sense’: Cambridge Resonances". 
7 This is the main argument of Putnam’s 1988,  Representation and Reality. 
8 See Putnam 2016, Naturalism, Realism and Normativity, his final book.  Cf. David MacArthur and Mario de Caro 
2004, Naturalism in Question. 
9 Though he credited David Lewis with seeing “exactly what the problem is” about “naturalness” and “simplicity” 
being interest-relative, Hilary rejected Lewis’s proposal that certain classes are “intrinsically” natural, failing to see 
why adding such an unfamiliar metaphysical primitive as “intrinsically natural” to our conceptual scheme is better than 
just taking the notion of reference--i.e., a notion imbricated with truth--as an unreduced primitive notion.  Quite right: 
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Rules of thumb, deference to notions that remain plastic at the margins, are all we have as 
we sail along in Neurath’s boat.   
 Yet Hilary was a more positive and pluralistic philosopher than Quine.  Burt 
Dreben once wrote that where Quine was a Jacobin, tearing down the ancien regime, 
Hilary remained a Girondin (Hilary accepted this as a compliment).10  Against Quine, 
Hilary stood for pluralism in ontology and regarded epistemology as a subject irreducible 
to, though entangled with, psychology.  And he defended explanatory talk of concepts 
and modalities, reconstructing (like Kripke) revisable notions of the relative, empirical a 
priori and the a posteriori analytic, though without a possible worlds semantics. He 
explicitly and repeatedly attacked non-cognitivism about value.11  He never treated “there 
is” as a matter of ongoing schematization, as it ultimately was for Quine.  For Hilary, 
reference and existence must never be regarded as ultimately inscrutable, lest truth be lost 
hold of.  
 As he wrote, 
I would change Neurath’s picture in two ways. First, I would put ethics, 
philosophy, in fact the whole culture, in the boat, and not just ‘science’, for I 
believe all the parts of the culture are interdependent. And, second, my image is not 
of a single boat but of a fleet of boats. The people in each boat are trying to 
reconstruct their own boat without modifying it so much at any one time that the 
boat sinks, as in the Neurath image. In addition, people are passing supplies and 
tools from one boat to another and shouting advice and encouragement (or 
disencouragement) to each other. Finally, people sometimes decide they don’t like 
the boat they’re in and move to a different boat altogether. (And sometimes a boat 
sinks or is abandoned.) It’s all a bit chaotic; but since it is a fleet, no one is ever 
totally out of signaling distance from all the other boats. There is, in short, both 
collectivity and individual responsibility. If we hanker for more, is that not our old 
and unsatisfiable yearning for Absolutes?12  
  
 Positive pragmatic pluralism is difficult.   To say “there is” is not something 
univocal.  It is also not a matter of stipulating for the sake of argument a framework, or 
                                                                                                                                            
this particular form of absolutism is a ideal check that cannot be cashed in.  See Putnam 1989/1994,  ``Model Theory 
and the Factuality of Semantics”, at pp. 359-60. 
10 Burton Dreben 1992, “Putnam, Quine - and the Facts”. 
11 A majority of Hilary’s works are centered on the theme of getting values right.  However, the theme of the collapse 
of the fact/value dichotomy asserted itself more strongly and generally over time, partly as a result of collaborations 
with Ruth Anna Putnam on the history and nature of pragmatism.  Cf. Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam 1990, 
"Epistemology as Hypothesis" and Ruth Anna Putnam  2002, "Taking Pragmatism Seriously", with Hilary’s reply to 
the latter. 
12 Hilary Putnam 1981/1983, “Philosophers and Human Understanding”. 
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accepting the ordinary as a seat of certainty, or making up a fiction, or invoking physics 
in general, or giving up on our perfectionistic ideals to become “realistic”—although 
each of these moves are explored, tested, and responded to in Hilary’s writing.  Instead, 
“there is” must be regarded as a matter of true, hard-won, genuine representation of 
reality.  But what is “genuineness”?  
 That is the question.  Any answer requires a detailed investigation of a multitude of 
areas of science and human inquiry, pleas for judgment and tolerance, receptivity and 
activity, artful distinction-drawing and, above all, fox-like argumentation.  Hilary 
admired and drew from Stanley Cavell’s moral perfectionism.13  But he did not fill his 
writings with quite so many optatives.  As a Girondin, his ideals were pragmatic.  
 “Representation” he construed very broadly, encompassing impressions, 
statements, concepts, perceptions, valuations, arguments and more.  His overarching 
point was that there is and can be no one privileged way to read directly off of a 
representation that “there are” such and suches. Representation of reality is something 
active, reflecting our culture, our reason, our interpretations, and our evolved capacities, 
including philosophical and logical capacities which reflect on and represent all of this 
representing.  “Reality” includes discussion of human nature, our values and ideals and 
our points of view, our collective sense of what is possible and what is necessary.  Claims 
of this kind should be embedded in culture actively and collectively, through 
argumentation and more representation and development of what is real.  
 So far much of the same might be said of many of the pragmatists who preceded 
him.  But more than his predecessors, Hilary the logician always attuned himself to 
stance, to the place from which a statement is uttered, the self-referential and reflective 
capacities we have also developed.  Everywhere there are limits (sometimes unforeseen 
and unforeseeable, sometimes not).14  But not all of them represent epistemological 
defects in us.  If they do, then how they do is important to make clear in detail (this was 
one key mistake embedded in Hilary’s “internal realism”, shorn from his philosophy by 
the later 1980s).15 In the course of investigating limits, Hilary insisted that we must keep 
                                                
13 See Putnam 1999, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World, pp. 125ff. 
14 For a sophisticated argument applying Gödel to make an epistemological point about the in principle limits on our 
knowing of ourselves if our rational capacities were computational in nature, see Putnam 1985/1994, "Reflexive 
Reflections". 
15 On this shearing see Putnam’s Prometheus Lecture 2010/2012, “Corresponding with Reality”. His most famous 
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in view and discuss, not only near, contingent, ordinary and shared features of reality, but 
also fundamentals and outer conceptual and speculative limits.  These will be delivered to 
us not only through philosophy and logic, but also by history, religion, physics, morality 
and mathematics.     
   As to his fundamental moves, he famously and very early on rejected 
instrumentalism about theoretical entities and jettisoned Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s idea 
that concepts are constituted by their roles in particular theories.16  Whether or not cats 
might be robots, or robots cats, can’t be said to be “theory-laden” in one kind of way, and 
concepts are not sums of necessary and sufficient marks.  He always emphasized 
Goodman’s insistence that induction is not reducible to formal deduction, and that 
therefore purposes and interests matter to generalizations.17  There are conceptual 
relativities, but—here contra Goodman—we cannot individuate particular ones easily or 
systematically. He accepted Reichenbach’s realism about physics: there are quarks, 
quasars, whatever it is that physics centrally commits itself to (and this itself needs 
detailed exploration by physicists and philosophers, it doesn’t come for free).  But he 
rejected Quine’s monism about “there is”, refusing to privilege physics as ultimate arbiter 
of ontology.  
 Hilary took mathematics to be in the business of representing conceptually possible 
structures: another departure from Quine, as this takes modality—the concepts of 
possibility and necessity---to be fundamental to our understanding of representation.  The 
question must then become which ones does it most matter to say “there are”?  For some 
conceptual possibilities appear to be more central and natural than others, some more 
fundamental, some peripheral, and so on.  
 Just here the otherwise positive pragmatic pluralist faced his own, self-professed 
limits.  He remained “undecided” about whether a “possible conceptual structure” should 
be understood as a “possible state of affairs”.  And he was therefore committed to the 
                                                                                                                                            
arguments for internal realism are in his 1981 Reason Truth and History and his 1980/1983 “Models and Reality.” For 
better or for worse, these two works were those with which I first began reading Hilary as an undergraduate.  I have the 
impression that the latter work is too often read as a standalone, purely technical piece, rather than a moment in a line 
of thinking aimed at developing a larger philosophical story.  See Kanamori In-press 2016, “Putnam’s 
Constructivization Argument” for a survey of this tendency.  
16 H. Putnam, 1965/1975. "How Not to Talk about Meaning".   
17 H. Putnam, 1979/1983, "Reflections on Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking". 
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idea that we are not likely to get clear any time soon about which mathematical objects 
and properties there are.18  
 He didn’t subscribe to any of the current philosophies of mathematics on the 
market.  Nominalism and fictionalism are, he said, “primrose paths” not to go down.19  A 
child of six or seven, he argued, can understand a beginning notion of the infinite for 
natural numbers in the form of  “and so on”: there is always a next one.  Hilary found no 
cogent reason to attack this ordinary understanding.  Finitists and physicalists often 
assume a determinate notion of “finite” in their arguments.  But, Hilary argued, logically 
speaking we do not have this sufficiently clear for an ontology.20  Constructivism is an 
approach one may develop, but predicativists must fess up to the parts of mathematics 
they cannot account for.  Set theorists should also be honest about what they are not 
explaining. 
 Hilary’s ambivalence about the foundations of mathematics and morality was 
intrinsic to his positive pragmatic pluralism. Norms and concepts and beliefs there are, 
but our certainties and concepts are localized, a feature of general capacities that evolve 
in the light of our representations and our representation of our own representations.  As 
he came to more and more strongly emphasize over time (elaborating an image Cora 
Diamond drew from Wittgenstein), we must aim to make the human face of necessity and 
possibility appear in our representations.21  This point is emphatically not a matter of 
linguistic meaning (as Wittgensteinians too often cavalierly say) or of verificationism.  It 
is one that turns on reason, reality, and representation: our human capacities for 
discussing, fashioning and contesting what is genuine, true, good, and reasonable.   
 Just here Hilary was an enthusiastic follower of Charles Travis’s insistence that 
while there may be a sense in which the possibilities for what may be said in a language 
may be taken to be fixed compositionally, the individuation of which truth-value is being 
                                                
18 H. Putnam, “Reply to Shope”, in Randall E. Auxier, Douglas R. Anderson and Lewis Edwin Hahn, eds. 2015, The 
Philosophy of Hilary Putnam, pp. 385-7, at 387. 
19 H. Putnam, “Reply to Wagner”, in Randall E. Auxier, Douglas R. Anderson and Lewis Edwin Hahn, eds. 2015, The 
Philosophy of Hilary Putnam, pp. 240-258, at 241. 
20 Putnam, “Reply to Field”, in Randall E. Auxier, Douglas R. Anderson and Lewis Edwin Hahn, eds. The Philosophy 
of Hilary Putnam, pp.  173-180, at 175. 
21 See Putnam 1999, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World, passim and Diamond 1968/1991, “The Face of 
Necessity”.  I discuss Wittgenstein’s analogy between facial features and logical features of sentences in my In-press 
2017a, “Aspects of Aspects”;  Hilary describes the impact of Diamond’s essay on him in his “Reply to Diamond”, in 
Auxier, Anderson and Hahn, eds. 2015, The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam, at p. 640. 
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expressed on a given occasion of using a sentence requires understandings among us: and 
yet this does not undercut a robust understanding, either of truth or of objectivity.22  Yet 
he differed with Travis (and John McDowell) on the characteristic roles of concepts and 
perception in our representations.  As usual here Hilary was fox-like, granting their 
arguments against sense data but insisting on aspect perception as something conceptual 
and representational, though only in a complex, psychologically mediated way.23 
 At the same time, Hilary insisted, the human face of necessity must include and 
incorporate the outer limits of comprehensiveness and comprehensibility. He admired 
and followed efforts to chart and control the infinite (e.g. Woodin’s ultimate L 
construction and Friedman’s reverse mathematics and concrete incompleteness).  He also 
examined efforts to draw religion and comprehensive moral views into everyday life.  He 
refused to read intuitionists “out of the camp of philosophy”, while always subscribing to 
the law of the excluded middle, a subscription he articulated and cast differently at 
different times.24   
  In the end, he concluded that mathematics and ethics should not be assumed, like 
physics, to be founded on any specific ontology.  Fact and value, norm and representation 
are everywhere too closely intertwined throughout these subjects.  Of course, we should 
be open to surprises: after all, who knows?  Physics itself has shown and may yet again 
show the errors of some of our mathematical ways of conceiving things, as in the 
development of non-Euclidean geometry---Hilary’s key example in establishing the 
notion of the reviseable a priori.  Human culture evolves, and the discussion will and 
should go on. In the end though, he advised, let us expect in mathematics and morality no 
more than the reasonable, and not mistake them for the rational as such.    
 Hilary was most renowned in philosophy during his own lifetime for two specific 
theses.  First, the idea of the contextual, relative a priori: there are unthinkables for us, 
but what is unthinkable now may become thinkable in light of new knowledge (one of his 
favorite quotes was from Edgar Bergen’s dummy Mortimer Snerd: “Who would’ve thunk 
                                                
22 See Travis, 2006 Thought’s Footing and Travis 2011, Objectivity and the Parochial. Discussion of Travis on this 
particular point occurs briefly but concisely, in Putnam 2002, “Travis on Meaning, Thought and the Ways the World 
Is”. 
23 See Putnam 2013, "Comments on Travis and McDowell”. 
24 On not reading intuitionists, nominalists, and fictionalists “out of the camp of philosophy” see Floyd and Putnam, 
2006,“Bays, Steiner, and Wittgenstein’s ‘Notorious’ Paragraph About the Gödel Theorem” and Floyd and Putnam, 
2008/2012 “Wittgensteins ‘Notorious’ Paragraph about the Gödel Theorem: Recent Discussions”. 
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it?”).  Second, semantic externalism and the division of linguistic labor: there are 
entanglements our representations have with our evolved community of experts and 
standards, as well as the environment (natural, social, historical).  Meanings ain’t in the 
head, and they ain’t in pure conventions either. 
 I think that the best and most lasting in Hilary’s writing is and should be, not so 
much the views he embraced and rejected, but the argumentation.  Logic, logic, logic.  So 
many arguments, displaying so much refinement, sensitivity, and creativity.  Long ones, 
quirky ones, technical ones, memorable ones, ones with great moral force and passion, 
repeated ones, qualified ones, retrospectively retracted ones, ones taken from and shared 
and developed with others.  There is so much to learn here about philosophy’s follies, 
possibilities, and prospects.  Hilary’s style of writing is masterful. It is crafted with 
purpose, according to a certain ideal, namely, that any reflective reader should be able to 
feel, by the end of the article or book, that he or she might have something to say about 
the topics discussed, or at least, that he or she has learned something worth knowing or 
thinking about. 
 Everywhere Hilary’s intricate spider’s web of argumentation lives on, the best of 
the very best as an example of how to think and write.  It is the opposite, truly the 
opposite, of the kind of if-thenism about isms and concepts we see pursued all too often 
in contemporary analytic philosophy. Concepts are not constituted, he argued, by 
necessary and sufficient marks alone, nor only by taxonomies of isms.  
 He was no nitpicker.  Hilary played for real, and not just for forensic or reductio 
keeps.  He never pursued positions only to show that they wouldn’t work: if they 
wouldn’t, then they wouldn’t, but then something else, hopefully reasonable, would have 
to be put into place, very likely something some other philosopher might have initially 
thought of.  This Hilary would develop, always extracting something positive from the 
view that he thought had failed. 
  According to positive pragmatic pluralism, we are constantly finding ourselves and 
our words to be entangled.   One distinction drawn entangles us with another.  A 
conclusion enunciated forces reflection on that enunciation.  There are morals to be 
drawn from this.  Never assimilate passively the dominant philosophical outlooks of your 
time.  Be prepared to be surprised, but also to hold on to what seems clearly central and 
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natural from the perspective of a developed point of view or theory.  Don’t invoke 
pseudo-clear notions, but know when you have your hands on a concept of real 
importance—for example, the concept of what is “deep” in a theory—and protect it 
against unnecessary and impossible demands that it be made clear in general or 
proceduralized.25 Listen to other philosophers; learn from them, differ with them, engage, 
discuss.  Use anecdotes and real, concrete examples from history, but don’t be afraid of 
thought experiments to get people to stop gliding over needless assumptions. Knowledge 
and imagination matter. And our connection with past philosophers. 
 Cornel West is right to have written that Hilary was a “jazzman of the mind”.26  He 
constantly riffed on the classical questions, mastering while remixing them, drawing out 
the entanglements, putting the great predecessors, and his contemporaries and students, 
into motion.  Hilary can seem impenetrable to younger philosophers, as can jazz.  But his 
inventiveness, his willingness to improvise, to listen to cacophonies and extract sense, is 
of the essence for us.  We will continue riffing on the philosophical classics over and 
over again.  But if we listen to Hilary, we will do it better: improvising, revising, 
contesting, qualifying, sharing and re-interpreting — representing — reality.27 
  
                                                
25 Putnam, “Reply to Ebbs”, in Randall E. Auxier, Douglas R. Anderson and Lewis Edwin Hahn, eds. The Philosophy 
of Hilary Putnam, pp.  412-418, at 417.  A twin mistake is to suppose that what is “core” to a theory can be understood 
independently of a standpoint.  For an argument against this see Putnam 1987/1994, “The Diversity of the Sciences: 
Global versus Local Methodological Approaches” at  p. 496. 
26 Cornel West 2015, “Hilary Putnam and the Third Enlightenment”, p. 765. Putnam liked the description of him as a 
“jazzman of the life of the mind” very much; cf. his “Reply to West”, in Auxier, Anderson and Hahn eds. 2015, The 
Philosophy of Hilary Putnam, p. 768. 
27 Thanks are due to and Jan Harald Alnes, David Macarthur, Ruth Anna Putnam, and Sander Verhaegh for comments 
on drafts of this paper. 
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